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defeat can hardly be explained in terms of its military performance, as the capa-
bility gap was too great; the only possibility for avoiding defeat when war
became imminent would have been a different political strategy.
Iraq obviously pursued a strategy of hard balancing prior to and during the
war: Iraq rejected the international demands for full inspection of Iraqi sites,
carried out a military build-up, escalated its rhetoric, and issued threats of using
chemical weapons if attacked. The only hard balancing element not included
was the formation of a counter-alliance. This was not an option, however, as
there were no available alliance partners at the time.
The Iraqi policy prior to 2003 tells a story about reliance on WMDs in the
sense that Iraq kept the international society guessing about its capacity (Hansen
2003: Ch. 13; Tripp 2007: 273). The investigations following the 2003 war
revealed that Iraq had no active nuclear programme and had not succeeded in re-
building its chemical and biological stockpiles, which were destroyed in the
aftermath of Operation Desert Storm. Over the years, Saddam s regime never-
theless insisted first on limited cooperation with the inspections teams then on
no cooperation at all thereby deliberately attempting to raise doubts about its
capacity. The Iraqi actions should be viewed against its previous record: Iraq
had used chemical weapons during the Iraq Iran war (Haselkorn 1999); stock-
piles and programmes were revealed after Operation Desert Storm; chemical
weapons had been used in Halabja; and a mock chemical attack had been carried
out in Southern Iraq (Baram 2003). These actions lent some credibility to the
Iraqi WMD-policy.
States considered nuclear threshold states may occasionally want to give the
impression that they have already achieved a capacity or that they are so close
118 The Middle East
that it is impossible to prevent them from crossing the threshold. If the adver-
saries believe or fear that the state in question has already crossed the threshold,
they are likely deterred from attacking. On the other hand, a threshold state may
also be careful not to overstate its efforts in order to avoid invoking condemna-
tion or pre-emptive strikes (Hansen 2003). The Iraqi WMD-policy between
1993 and 2003 reflected both concerns. In particular, the blocking of UN inspec-
tions between 1998 and 2002 represented a dangerous policy, even though Iraq
attempted to accompany the policy with public statements that they did not
possess WMDs. Against the background of general Iraqi weakness, the WMD-
policy of ambiguity came to play a major role in the Iraqi attempts to carry out
hard balancing. The American emphasis on non-proliferation policy highlighted
this element of the Iraqi strategy.
The US also emphasized the question of international terrorism. There were
only two indications of active Iraqi support for terrorism. The first was provid-
ing shelter to Abu Nidal, the famous Palestinian terrorist and leader of the Abu
Nidal Organization, which had a long record of international attacks. Abu Nidal,
however, was already reported dead in August 2002. He was found shot in his
apartment in Baghdad, and it is likely (although the circumstances remain some-
what unclear) that he was murdered on orders from Saddam s regime in order to
remove a legitimate excuse for the international community to pursue further
pressure on Iraq in the light of 9/11. The second indication was the Iraqi support
for Palestinian suicide bombers attacking Israeli targets; some of the bombers
families were offered rewards.
After 9/11, Iraq was the only Arab state to fail to condemn the terrorist
attacks. In the light of the worldwide condemnation of the terrorist attacks and
the UN agreement on further measures, the Iraqi position sent a strong signal.
Nevertheless, there was no evidence of active support beyond this kind of moral
and political support for the terrorists. Nor was there any evidence that Iraq sup-
ported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Consequently, it seems appropriate to
designate the Iraqi policy until 2003 regarding reliance on international terror-
ism as only soft balancing.
The Arab Israeli Palestinian peace process, launched in 1991, did not receive
support from Iraq. After the 1991 Madrid peace conference initiative, Iraq sharp-
ened its rhetoric. Baghdad generally advocated the Palestinian cause and criticized
Israel. Saddam s son, Uday, published twelve articles questioning Israel s right to
exist, and Arafat was called a traitor after the signing of the Declaration of Prin-
ciples in 1993. It was insinuated that Arafat deserved the fate of Egyptian Presid-
ent Anwar Sadat (Bengio 1998), who was assassinated in 1981 after entering the
Camp David Accords, the peace agreements signed with Israel in 1978. The Iraqi
position was somewhat moderated in the 1990s, possibly an attempt at achieving a
lifting of the sanctions (1998). However, Iraq continued to criticize the peace
process and oppose this cornerstone in US Middle East policy.
The 2003 War forced Iraq to alter its strategy dramatically. However, Iraq
was under coalition occupation the first year after the invasion, and Iraq was
struggling with an internal insurgency in the years that followed.
The Middle East 119
Iraq s post-Cold War strategy was one of persistent hard balancing, although
its means after the defeat in Kuwait in February 1991 were rather limited. The
story of the Iraqi efforts became a tale of an authoritarian state attempting to
compensate for losses of relative power by invasion and continuously trying to
keep its opponents at bay by means of a strategy of ambiguity. These ( dis-
count ) balancing efforts were severely punished, however, as they eventually
resulted in the 2003 invasion and ensuing occupation by the US-led coalition
and the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime.
Libya
When the Cold War ended, Libyan US relations were hostile. In the course of
the 1980s, Libyan foreign policy became increasingly anti-Western, and Libya
was lodged in a confrontational posture vis-à-vis much of the international
system (Niblock 2002: 227). At the same time, the US sharpened its policy
towards Libya (2002: 227).
The main conflict regarded Libyan support for international terrorism, which
was intended in the first place to eliminate the internal and external enemies of
the Libyan Revolution (Martinez 2007: 55). The Libyan activities resulted in US
bombings of targets in Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 following a terrorist attack in
a Berlin discotheque killing two US soldiers and the establishment of the US
blacklist of terrorist states. In addition to the Libyan state-sponsoring of terrorism,
Libya had pursued a radical stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, the Libyan response to the Iraqi invasion of Iraq in 1990 was rather
moderate compared to the previous Libyan rhetoric and anti-imperialist policy.
To begin with, Libya denounced the Iraqi invasion of another Arab state, sec-
ondly, Libya strongly argued against foreign intervention.
At the Arab League Cairo summit on 10 August 1990, Libya was one of only
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