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large Afghan cities with an economic block-
ade.
In the talks with Aga Khan it should
be suggested that UN convoys of foodstuffs,
petroleum products, and medical supplies
go not only through Pakistan, but, to a sig-
nificant extent,through Soviet Union.
In all of the four enumerated scenarios
it is intended that at least an insignificant
number of Soviet troops is to be left behind
after 15 February 1989.
There still remains to be examined yet
another, fifth, scenario - Soviet forces are
withdrawn completely before 15 February,
but we give the Afghan Side additional as-
sistance, including financial, in the organi-
zation of the defense of the Hairaton-Kabul
highway using their own forces, up to the
point of completely providing for these Af-
ghan units for a determined time-period,
though, undoubtedly, this would be tied to
considerable difficulties, especially in en-
suring a dependable convoy escort.
As for the Kabul airport, keeping in
mind its importance, it is expedient to have
there, with the conclusion of corresponding
agreements with the Afghan Side, our own
control tower staff, numbering up to 100
people.
2. From the side of the Afghan gov-
ernment a question has been raised concern-
ing the continuation of air assaults and bom-
bardments of the armed opposition forces
carried out by Soviet aviation from our ter-
ritory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
The difficulty of this question is being ex-
plained to the Afghan comrades; they are
being advised to think about how to make
better use of the capabilities of their own
aviation under the new circumstances. On
the whole, our explanations have been re-
ceived with understanding, but, at the same
time, they say that in some of the more criti-
cal situations, the use of Soviet aviation may
be simply indispensable. It appears that this
question cannot be examined without tak-
ing into account all the internal and exter-
nal factors.
3. The Afghan Side assigns serious
significance to having at its disposal such
powerful types of weapons as the R-300
rockets and batteries of “Hurricane” multi-
rocket launchers. These questions evidently
require a differentiated approach to this or
another type of weapon, but the general line
should be directed, inasmuch as is possible,
towards a more complete satisfaction of
Afghan requests. It should be kept in mind
that the very fact of possessing such types
of weapons would strongly reinforce our
friends psychologically and give them con-
fidence in their forces. Taking this into ac-
count, batteries of “Hurricane” have already
been set up in the Special Guards and the
RA [Republic of Afghanistan] army. The R-
300 rocket batteries, which are currently
with the Soviet military contingent, may also
be transferred to the Afghan Side after modi-
fying them to an export model and after the
preparation of Afghan personnel for use and
maintenance of these units, which should
be quickly carried out on our territory.
4. It would be expedient to positively
decide the question concerning the use of
the USSR border force capacities in the Af-
ghan border zone, keeping in mind, how-
ever that the Soviet mobile border groups
currently stationed there will not remain.
5. Lately, we have been doing quite a
bit to give the Afghan friends economic as-
sistance in accordance with exactly those
difficulties that Afghanistan is in. This as-
sistance, despite all kinds of difficulties with
which both we and the Afghans met during
its shipment and distribution, has without a
doubt averted numerous undesirable turns
in the situation’s development.
Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty
of the Afghan situation, we must once again
very carefully re-examine the current eco-
nomic processes which are of the utmost
importance to its internal political situation.
We must determine what can be done addi-
tionally to improve the Afghan economy
which is in a critical state and, in effect, on
the brink of ruin; we must give operational
assistance to solve the acute problems which
are arising, in particular through the ship-
ments if foodstuffs and goods of first ne-
cessity to Kabul and various provinces of
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